

**Shared Representations of the Nation-State in Thirty Countries:
An Inductive Approach to Cross-National Attitudinal Research**

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ABSTRACT

This study develops a novel analytical approach to studying cross-national variation in popular conceptions of the nation-state that makes it possible to account for both within- and between-country heterogeneity and to avoid reductive *a priori* assumptions about the national boundedness of attitudes. I use inductive survey analysis methods to identify common attitudinal patterns among 27,790 respondents from thirty countries and only subsequently examine those respondents' national affiliations and individual attributes. I then ask how the observed popular conceptions of the nation-state and their cross-national distribution changed between 1995 and 2003 and what macro-level factors produced those changes. The results of the study reveal four characteristics of popular nationalism in democratic countries: 1) Popular nationalism is far more heterogeneous than is suggested by existing theories; 2) All varieties of nationalism are present in all countries, though their relative prevalence varies; 3) The content of the distinct varieties of nationalism is stable over time; and 4) The distribution of the distinct varieties of nationalism within each country changes in response to economic and political events that increase the salience of the nation-state. These results make an important contribution to the nationalism literature and provide a model for a more nuanced comparative approach to the study of political culture.

Shared Representations of the Nation-State in Thirty Countries: An Inductive Approach to Cross-National Attitudinal Research

Popular attitudes toward the nation-state have been linked to a variety of other sociologically relevant preferences and behaviors. Researchers have demonstrated that individuals' beliefs about criteria of legitimate national membership can influence their voting and policy choices, particularly when the nation is made salient in political discourse (Sears 1993; Citrin et al. 1990, 2001). Likewise, restrictive conceptions of a nation's social boundaries, high levels of national pride and attachment, and feelings of national superiority have been associated with in-group favoritism and out-group prejudice (Blank, Schmidt, and Westle 2001; Ceobanu and Escandell 2008; Kunovich 2009).¹ Historians have made similar claims with respect to elites, arguing that legislative support for more or less exclusionary policies toward immigrants and minorities has been historically shaped by elites' idealized conceptions of the nation's character (R. Smith 1988, 1997).

Yet, despite the importance of popular understandings of the nation-state, we know relatively little about how these phenomena vary across countries and over time. Much comparative nationalism research conducted by survey analysts and historians has been reductive; all too often, it has identified individual nation-states with specific forms of nationalism without paying serious attention to within-country heterogeneity. This form of "methodological nationalism", that is, a taken-for-granted view of the nation-state as a naturally

¹ The nationalism literature typically defines a "nation" as a group that views itself as legitimately deserving of its own state, due to the distinctiveness of its culture, language, ethnic roots, and/or historical territory. When the group's boundaries are congruous with those of a state, the entity is referred to as a nation-state. Because the survey questions I rely on make reference to specific countries rather than sub-national groups, I treat all the countries in the sample as "nation-states" regardless if they are home to one or multiple national groups. Furthermore, I use the terms "nation-state" and "nation" interchangeably, even though I recognize the conventional distinctions between them.

bounded unit of analysis, has been widespread in the social sciences (Wimmer and Schiller 2002).

Within nationalism research, this tendency is exemplified by the work of Hans Kohn (1944), which classified countries as espousing either a Western or Eastern variety of nationalism. Elaborating a dichotomy originally developed by Meinecke (1970 [1908]), Kohn argues that Western (or civic) nationalism is based on elective membership in a nation that is understood primarily as a political and territorial community, while Eastern (or ethnic) nationalism is based on ascriptive criteria of membership in a nation that is conceptualized first and foremost as a community of descent. Although this typology has become less rigid in its subsequent applications, the assumption that nation-state borders provide natural bounds for homogenous nationalist ideologies persists in contemporary comparative research (e.g., A. Smith 1991; Ignatieff 1993; Schopflin 1995). As Brubaker (2004) has persuasively argued, such “groupism” – the conflation of analytical categories (e.g., the nation-state) with empirical groups (e.g., a community with shared beliefs) – leads to theoretically untenable and empirically inaccurate conclusions.

In contrast, this paper seeks to develop a rigorous analytical approach to the study of nationalist attitudes that takes seriously both within- and between-country heterogeneity. By analyzing pooled cross-national survey data using inductive methods, I avoid making *a priori* judgments about the national boundedness of culture. Instead, I identify common patterns of beliefs among all respondents from thirty countries and only subsequently examine the respondents’ national affiliations along with a variety of other individual-level attributes. Having mapped the heterogeneity of popular conceptions of the nation-state within each country, I ask how those understandings and their cross-national distribution have changed between 1995

and 2003 and how those changes relate to the countries' evolving economic, political, and national security conditions.

The results demonstrate that cross-national differences in popular nationalism are best understood in terms of the relative salience of multiple conceptions of the nation-state within countries rather than in terms of essential country-level differences. Furthermore, the content of the multiple shared representations of the nation-state is remarkably stable, but their relative prevalence within each country varies over time. I argue that this temporal variation represents a popular response to major macro-level events, whose impact on the nation is interpreted and framed by political and intellectual elites and the mass media.

NATIONALIST ATTITUDES

This paper is concerned with “nationalist attitudes,” but this concept is bound to be misunderstood if nationalism is viewed solely as a conscious ideology deployed by elites in the pursuit of political projects, like the founding of new nation-states or the reorganization of existing ones. Such elite ideology certainly falls under the rubric of nationalism, but it hardly exhausts its definition. Nationalism can also be understood as a pervasive cognitive orientation based on the taken-for-granted assumption that the nation-state is a natural and primary object of loyalty and identification, as well as a fundamental building block of the modern institutional order (Greenfeld 1995). I refer to this institutionalized and widely diffused perception as “popular nationalism.” The concept of popular nationalism places emphasis on everyday attitudes of ordinary people in all nation-states, including nation-states that do not experience flare-ups of nationalism's more overt and incendiary varieties.

Existing research has focused primarily on explicitly ideological nationalism—particularly as it is employed by radical political movements—rather than on everyday, popular

nationalism. The emphasis stems in part from the obvious political and social significance of nationalist mobilization and its destabilizing consequences: nationalist movements tend to challenge existing institutional arrangements, thereby producing conditions of political and social instability and, in extreme cases, widespread violence. Yet, such unsettled moments are relatively infrequent in established democracies. Therefore, for most observers, nationalism is something that happens elsewhere—typically in new, institutionally unstable, or ethnically fractionalized nation-states—or in the distant past, most notably in the successive waves of nation-state-building during the 19th and 20th centuries.

It is a mistake, however, to equate the relative infrequency of nationalist unrest in contemporary societies with the absence of nationalism. As modernist theorists of nationalism point out, the nation-state is a relatively recent political and economic invention, whose ongoing success depends on the sustained popular belief in the reality of national communities, characterized by a shared sense of common history and culture (Gellner 1983, Anderson 1991 [1983]). The largely unquestioned legitimacy of the nation-state as a cultural and institutional form is continually reproduced by the educational system and the mass media, as well the countless routine interactions between national populations and powerful national symbols, from flags and history books to name places and currency (Billig 1995). Yet, despite the thorough institutionalization of the nation-state, which makes it difficult to think outside of its cognitive constraints, the specific manner in which people conceptualize and frame their own nation-states varies, both within countries and between them. Describing and explaining this variation is the primary objective of this paper.

In order to map different ways in which people relate to their nation-states, we must first decide which types of attitudes should be taken into consideration. Past survey research has

focused on four distinct types of attitudes: national attachment (how close one feels to one's nation), national identity (what individual criteria one sees as important for legitimate membership in the nation), national pride (how proud one is of the nation's achievements in a variety of domains), and hubris (how one's nation compares to others). Analysts have often honed in on one or two of these categories, claiming to be measuring nationalism in general (e.g., Coenders and Scheepers 2003, Hjerem 2001). In contrast, my approach is to use indicators from all four categories, since they are all likely to be relevant for how people conceptualize and relate to their nation-states.

COMPARING POPULAR NATIONALISM ACROSS COUNTRIES

Social scientists are not immune from the tendency to internalize the belief in the ostensibly natural existence of nation-states (Wimmer and Schiller 2002). As a result, they often treat countries as internally homogeneous units of analysis. This has been true of comparative nationalism research in history (Kohn 1944), political sociology (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008), and comparative historical sociology (Brubaker 1992).

The emphasis on attitudinal variation at the country level is itself a product of the thorough institutionalization of the nation-state system. Because we are comfortable thinking in terms of national differences, such comparisons seem to have face validity. Identifying the similarities and differences between Americans and Spaniards appears to be more appropriate than doing so for Nebraskans and Andalusians. This leads scholars to look for ideal-typical features of each country's culture, which necessarily downplays the cultural heterogeneity of national populations. Yet, it is possible that within-country differences are as large, or even larger, than those between countries.

Suppose that respondents in the U.S. and Spain were asked to rate their taste for two meats: pork and beef. It is quite likely that the survey would find both populations to be split between those who like and dislike each meat. Even if pork was more popular in Spain than in the U.S. and beef was more popular in the U.S. than in Spain, it would be difficult to label one national group as pork-lovers and the other as beef-lovers without glossing over a considerable amount of within-country heterogeneity. Indeed, the overall tastes of pork-lovers in Spain may have more in common with those of pork-lovers in the U.S. than they do with those of their pork-averse compatriots. Matters would become even more complicated if we were to compare a larger range of preferences between the two countries' populations.

What are the implications of this example for comparative attitudinal research? First, we should not characterize entire populations by average levels of a particular cultural characteristic. Simply because more people score highly on a given variable in one country than another does not imply that the entire population can be defined by that result. Respondents with low and high scores on that variable can probably be found in both places, which makes it likely that more variation will be found within rather than between the countries. Second, if we want to find out whether respondents' cultural repertoires have more in common with those of their compatriots than those of their counterparts in other countries, we need to develop a way of systematically comparing the respondents' broader attitudinal profiles, that is, their answers to multiple survey questions (for instance, a spectrum of their culinary preferences). Third, given the heterogeneity found within groups, the most effective way to compare groups is to examine the relative prevalence of the attitudinal profiles in each group. For instance, we would want to know what percentage of Spaniards/Americans like both pork and beef, what percentage like one but not the other, and what percentage like neither. We would then want to know who exhibits

each pattern of preferences in each country. A similar approach can be applied to nationalism data by comparing respondents based on the similarity of their answers to a variety of nationalism-relevant questions.

The pitfalls of methodological nationalism can be avoided by using analytic tools that are more sensitive to within-country heterogeneity. One such tool is latent class analysis (LCA), a well-documented survey analysis method that clusters respondents based on the similarity in the pattern of their responses to multiple survey items. LCA has been used in a variety of fields, from medicine (Sullivan, Kessler, and Kendler 1998) to marketing (Bhatnagar and Ghose 2002) and cultural sociology (Van Rees, Vermunt, and Verbrood 1999).

LCA uses maximum likelihood estimation to model iteratively the relationship between multiple indicators in a data set and a predefined number of latent classes (more specifically, a single nominal variable, in which each value corresponds to a distinct latent class). The algorithm seeks to find a solution such that the indicators become conditionally independent of one another—that is, their pairwise correlations are reduced to zero—once the latent classes are taken into account. The algorithm then calculates a posterior probability of class assignment for each observation in the data set and classifies the observations as belonging to the class with the highest posterior probability. Thus, LCA should make it possible to identify groups of people who share the same understanding of their nation-states.

The logic of the LCA method is illustrated in Table 1, which presents a hypothetical data set consisting of eight observations (A-H) and three variables with values ranging from 1 to 4. All three variables in Table 1 are correlated with one another: the Pearson correlation between Var1 and Var2 is 0.196, the correlation between Var1 and Var3 is -0.385, and the correlation between Var2 and Var3 is -0.981. If these data were analyzed with LCA, the algorithm would

Table 1. Latent class analysis of hypothetical data set

Observation	Var1	Var2	Var3
A	1	3	2
B	3	4	1
C	3	4	1
D	2	1	3
E	1	3	2
F	2	1	3
G	2	1	3
H	1	3	2

group the cases into three latent classes based on the similarity of their responses, with the first class consisting of observations A, E, and H, the second class consisting of observations B and C, and the third class consisting of observations D, F, and G (in these stylized data, the probability of each observation's assignment to the relevant class would be 1.0). Because the response patterns of the individual cases within each class would be identical, we could conclude that membership in the classes effectively removed all interdependencies between the three variables. That is, the variables became independent, conditional on the assignment of the cases to the latent classes.²

If we set aside national boundaries and analyze the pooled data from all the countries, we can use LCA to inductively generate groups (i.e., classes) of respondents who share similar response patterns—that is, similar ways of understanding the nation-state—regardless of their national affiliations. Having obtained this information, we can then ask where these respondents live. If countries do fall into distinct nationalist camps, such as those defined by civic and ethnic nationalism, we should expect some of the latent classes to be found only in some countries. On the other hand, if all the latent classes are observed in all the countries in the sample, we can dismiss the reductive view of nationalism and ask additional questions, like where each class is

² In this hypothetical data set, the correlation between the variables within classes would be undefined (because the variables become constants—that is, they do not vary within classes), but in most practical applications of the method, classes have some variation within them, leading to correlations that approach zero but remain defined.

most prevalent, what are the individual-level predictors of assignment to each class, how does the content and distribution of classes change over time, and what accounts for such changes.

It is important to be precise about what it is that an LCA approach to attitudinal data actually measures. A useful analytical tool for thinking about meaning-making in specific cultural domains is the concept of a cognitive schema, which originates in cognitive psychology (Fiske and Linville 1980) and has made its way into cultural sociology (DiMaggio 1997).

Cognitive schemata are networks of association that impart coherence and order onto the messy and rapid flow of sensory information to which individuals are exposed in their daily lives. In addition to organizing and interpreting lived experience, schemata feature affective and evaluative components that make it possible for individuals to respond to stimuli in a manner consistent with their past experience and future aspirations. The schematic processing of information happens very quickly and without much deliberation (Lieberman et al. 2002).

Schemata are domain-specific, so it should be possible to map them for the cultural domain of the nation-state. There are many ways in which such research can be carried out. One option, for instance, would be to record associations evoked by country-relevant cues, such as potent national symbols. Another would be to conduct experiments that detect changes in behavior after an experimental group is primed with national symbols. A less contextually sensitive approach, but one that allows for large-scale comparisons of national populations, is to ask respondents a series of survey questions about their perceptions of their nation-state. This is the strategy employed in this paper. Given that this approach requires a certain amount of data aggregation, the resulting cultural models cannot be interpreted as direct measures of cognitive schemata, which are inherently individual-level phenomena. I will refer to them instead as shared representations of the nation (Durkheim 1964 [1895], Moscovici 1984, Thompson and

Fine 1999). Such representations average over, and hence abstract from, individually held understandings, but as such they may be able to approximate the kinds of cultural repertoires that are available to individuals in broader political culture. The profiles generated by LCA are shared because multiple respondents subscribe to them (to a lesser or greater degree) and they are representations because they consists of a set of interrelated attitudes that reflect people's perceptions and understandings of a specific domain of social life.

It should be stressed that the attempt to identify distinct shared understandings of the nation-state, or any other domain for that matter, differs considerably from the standard variable-based approach in attitudinal and public opinion research. The assumption here is that cultural representations should be viewed holistically, as the sum of all their constituent parts, rather than as sets of discrete attitudes that can be examined in isolation from one another. The interest is not in people's opinions *per se*, but in their cognitive understandings of a given social domain, which themselves reflect symbolic representations that exist at the supra-individual level (in media accounts, popular culture, political speeches, mass education, etc.).

Furthermore, the meaning conveyed by cultural models is inherently relational. A long tradition in structural linguistics and semiotics has demonstrated that symbols derive their meaning from their relationship to other symbols and not from their individual essence (Saussure 1960 [1916]; Levi-Strauss 1963; Mohr and Duquenne 1997; Yeung 2005). Consequently, to understand symbolic structures—that is, culture—we must take into account the constituent parts of those structures, as well as the relations of similarity and opposition among those parts. Leaving out some of the elements is akin to omitting variables in a regression analysis: it

produces biased results. It is for this reason that I focus the analysis on all four types of nationalism variables mentioned earlier: national attachment, identity, pride, and hubris.³

DATA

To model the shared representations of the nation-state and analyze their distribution across countries and over time, the paper uses data from the 1995 and 2003 National Identity Supplements to the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). The ISSP is a representative multinational survey administered independently in each participating country (in the U.S., it is incorporated into the General Social Survey). The survey focuses on respondents' attitudes on a variety of topics and features a wide selection of sociodemographic covariates.

The Aspects of National Identity II supplement was administered in 34 countries between 2003 and 2005. Residents of former East and West Germany were sampled separately, as were Israeli Jews and Arabs, bringing the number of separate samples to 36. For the purposes of the analysis, the East and West German samples were combined using the appropriate sample weights and four countries were excluded: Bulgaria, Latvia, and Israel were dropped because their questionnaires omitted a number of nationalism items; and Taiwan was excluded because of the dearth of covariate data stemming from its ambiguous administrative status. All respondents under the age of 18 and over the age of 65 were deleted from the data, as were non-citizens and cases with missing values on more than two nationalism items. The final sample size consisted of 27,790 observations from thirty countries, with an average of 926 respondents per country.

³ It is important to bear in mind that the central question in this project concerns not how people define the nation-state in general, but rather how they define *their particular* nation-state. A response to the question "what does the concept of a country mean to you?" is likely to consist of references to generic properties of nation-states, like sovereignty, borders, taxation, or shared culture, whereas the question "what does the United States mean to you?" is likely to yield more specific sentiments. Of course, cognitive schemata of particular countries are necessarily linked to schemata of the nation-state as a generic concept.

To analyze attitudinal change, I rely on data from the 1995 national identity supplement to the ISSP (administered between 1994 and 1996), which featured twenty of the countries included in the 2003 survey. The final sample size for the 1995 data was 18,613, ranging from 608 respondents for Hungary to 1,767 for Australia. The size of the comparative 2003 sample was reduced to 17,574. The two national identity supplements include twenty-six indicators of the four dimensions of nationalism, which are listed in detail in Appendix A, and all of which were included as indicators in the LCA model. The variables were recoded so that higher scores correspond to stronger feelings of attachment, more importance attached to each criterion of national membership, higher degrees of pride, and greater levels of hubris. The observations were weighted using individual-level sampling weights provided by the ISSP, as well as population weights to ensure that all countries contributed equally to the solution.

The dataset also includes a variety of covariates, which will be used to predict the likelihood of subscribing to a particular understanding of the nation. These include age, gender, marital status, education, religiosity, urban/rural location, political party affiliation, and parents' citizenship status. In addition to the ISSP data, I compiled country-level variables from a variety of sources that will make it possible to examine the causes of change in the distribution of shared representations across countries.

SHARED REPRESENTATIONS OF THE NATION-STATE


When conducting a latent class analysis, it is up to the analyst to decide how many classes the algorithm should identify. This decision is typically based on measures of goodness of fit, such as the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). Not surprisingly, when one is dealing with over 27,000 sets of responses to twenty-six survey questions, the goodness of fit measures are likely to favor solutions with a large number of classes. However, the number of classes has an inverse

relationship with interpretability. The more classes there are, the smaller are the differences between them and the lower is the analytical utility of the overall classification system. Also, more classes result in fewer observations per class, which makes it difficult to meaningfully analyze the correlates of class assignment.

It is possible to think of the choice of classes in an LCA model as the resolution with which one wants to view the attitudinal variation. At maximum resolution, 27,790 observations will yield up to 27,790 attitudinal profiles; at minimum resolution, they will yield one attitudinal profile.

The statistically preferable solution, one that yields the lowest BIC, is found somewhere in between these two extremes. However, pragmatically, a solution with only a few classes is preferable for the purposes of interpretability. To identify this optimal tradeoff point, it is possible to rely on a similar method to that routinely used in principal component and factor analysis for selecting the most appropriate number of factors. The method relies on a scree plot, which maps the number of factors against the additional information provided by the inclusion of each additional factor. The optimal stopping point is represented by an “elbow” in the plot, at which the amount of additional information generated by each new factor begins to level off. Analogously, when evaluating a series of LCA models, it is possible to identify an elbow in a two-way graph of BIC by the number of classes included in each model.

Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between BIC and number of classes in the ISSP nationalism data. The first graph reflects the full data for the 2003 sample of thirty countries and the second graph reflects the data for the 1995 and 2003 comparison samples of twenty countries. The graphs show BICs for solutions ranging from one to ten classes. For all three samples, the optimal tradeoff point is produced by the four-class solution: At first, the addition of

Figure 1. BIC values by number of classes

additional classes produces large payoffs in BIC improvement, but beyond four classes the payoff declines considerably.

A supplementary method for evaluating model fit is to examine how well the model is able to assign individual cases to the latent classes. The assignment process consists of two steps. First, the algorithm calculates a posterior probability of every respondent's assignment to each latent class. Second, every respondent is assigned to the class for which he or she has the highest posterior probability. In the four-class solution, for instance, hypothetical probabilities of 0.5, 0.2, 0.1, and 0.2 would result in assignment to the first class. The ability of the modal assignment process to produce unambiguous results can itself be used as a measure of model fit. If the majority of respondents have high posterior probabilities then we can be confident that the classes provide a reasonable fit to the data.

Table 2. Posterior Probabilities of Class Assignment, ISSP 2003.

Threshold	Class 1	Class 2	Class 3	Class 4	All
> 0.9	0.707	0.710	0.673	0.759	0.711
> 0.75	0.848	0.844	0.823	0.880	0.846
> 0.5	0.987	0.990	0.981	0.988	0.986

The proportion of cases in the full 2003 sample that exceed the 0.5, 0.75, and 0.9 probability thresholds for class assignment are presented in Table 2.⁴ The proportion denominators are the counts of all the cases assigned by the algorithm to the corresponding class using the modal probability method. The results demonstrate that the assignment process in the four-class solution is quite accurate, with 71.1 percent of cases having a posterior probability greater than 0.9 and 84.6 percent of cases having a probability greater than 0.75 (a lower but still highly discriminating probability threshold). A probability greater than 0.5 is the minimum threshold for necessarily unambiguous class assignment and, as the table illustrates, this threshold is exceeded by the vast majority of cases (98.6 percent).

There is some variation in the average posterior probabilities across the four classes, with Class 3 having the lowest modal probabilities and Class 4 having the highest modal probabilities. It appears that assignment to Class 3 is somewhat more ambiguous than assignment to the remaining classes, but the cross-class differences are small. One way to test the impact of low-probability class assignment is to perform post-estimation analyses with a sample restricted to high-probability cases and compare the results with those generated from a full sample. This strategy was employed for all of the analysis in this paper and no differences were found between the full sample and the restricted sample, further demonstrating the robustness of the four-class solution.

⁴ The proportions are similar for the 1995 and 2003 comparative samples, with 69.9 percent of cases having a posterior probability greater than 0.9, 83.3 percent of cases having a probability greater than 0.75, and 98.5 percent of cases having a probability greater than 0.5.

In addition to relying on the BIC metric and the accuracy of class assignment, it is also possible to test the robustness of the classes by comparing their content between the full 2003 sample and the 1995 and 2003 reduced comparison samples. This technique will be employed in a subsequent section of the paper.

The next step in the analysis is to examine how respondents in each of the four classes structure their understandings of the nation-state. After the classes are identified, the LCA algorithm calculates the probabilities of specific survey responses conditional on class assignment. Based on those probabilities, the algorithm then predicts the distribution of responses to each nationalism measure in every class. By examining these predicted responses, we can get a sense of the attitudinal profile of each class. Given that there are twenty-six variables, each of which has between four and five response categories, the easiest way to compare the classes is to use variable means.⁵ The class means for the twenty-six nationalism measures are presented in Figure 2.

It is important to remember that the values shown on the graphs represent central tendencies. Consequently, given that most of variables were measured using a forced-choice four-point scale, the 2.5 mark on the graph represents not an individual's lack of agreement or disagreement with a particular survey question, but rather an underlying distribution of positive and negative responses among all the respondents assigned to that class. For instance, the mean score of 2.49 on the item "Living in a country most of life" corresponds to the following proportions of responses: not important at all, 0.12; not very important, 0.37; fairly important, 0.42; and very important, 0.09.

⁵ The appropriateness of reporting mean values for ordinal data has been debated because the distances between the individual categories may not be equal. I use means here in the interests of parsimony. Having compared each mean value with the underlying variable distribution, I am confident that the means accurately capture the response patterns found in each of the four LCA classes.

To aid in the interpretation of the results, it is useful to label the latent classes based on their content. I have labeled the four classes as liberal, critical, populist, and ultranationalist. To the extent that the labels capture the most distinct aspects of each class, they represent a first step in the development of a comparative typology of nationalist attitudes.


Class 1: Liberal nationalism. The defining characteristics of the first class, which comprises 36.46 percent of the sample, are its moderate scores on the attachment, identity, and hubris variables, combined with a high degree of pride in all domains of the nation-state. Respondents in this class feel close to their region (mean of 2.99) and country (3.37) and are ambivalent about their attachment to their continent (2.64). Their notion of who is a legitimate member of the nation tends toward civic nationalism, with more emphasis placed on elective criteria, like respect for institutions and laws (3.38), language ability (3.34), and subjective feeling (3.30) than on ascriptive criteria, like religion (1.88), ancestry (2.32), and birth (2.71).

The pattern of responses to the pride items stands in contrast to the moderate values on the attachment and identity variables: members of Class 1 exhibit a high degree of pride in all aspects of the nation-state. In fact, only Class 4 has higher mean pride scores. None of the means for the pride variables in Class 1 fall below the mid-point of the response scale (a score of 2.5) and only two of the means indicate ambivalence toward the specific domains of the nation-state⁶: pride in the armed forces (2.72) and pride in the equal treatment of groups (2.73).

Finally, members of Class 1 exhibit moderate attitudes on measures of hubris, shame, and unconditional support for their countries. They are largely ambivalent about shame in their country (2.31), the need to support their country even if it is in the wrong (2.29), the belief in the superiority of their compatriots over others (2.44), and the belief that their country is better than

⁶ I interpret the middle of the response scale, ranging from 2.25 to 2.75, as reflecting ambivalence within the class concerning the specific domain evoked by the survey question.

Figure 2. Variable means by latent class, ISSP 2003.^a



^a Att = Attachment; Id = Identity, Prd = Pride, Reg = Hubris, Oth = Shame

most others (2.79).⁷ They express moderate agreement only with the least exceptionalist measure of hubris: preference for their own citizenship (3.17).

Because the model of the nation-state espoused by members of this class consists of moderate attachment to the nation, relative open-mindedness about the nation's social boundaries, and a fairly strong sense of pride in the nation-state's accomplishments without strong feelings of hubris, I refer to it as *liberal nationalist*. Its characteristics are reminiscent of the restrained and inclusive disposition toward the nation advocated by liberal theorists like Kymlicka (1995) and Tamir (1993). This label should not be confused with political liberalism—whether or not liberal nationalism and liberal political ideology are correlated is an empirical question that will be explored in a subsequent section of the paper.

Class 2: Critical nationalism. The second class, which comprises 24.42 percent of the sample, consistently scores lowest on all the nationalism variables. Members of this class have moderate levels of national attachment and their conception of the nation's social boundaries leans strongly toward civic nationalism. In that respect, they are quite similar to members of the liberal nationalist class. However, the two classes diverge sharply on measures of national pride. Liberal nationalists are unambiguously proud of all aspects of their countries, while members of Class 2 consistently exhibit a lack of pride in or ambivalence about their countries' achievements.

Indeed, no other class scores lower than Class 2 on any of the pride measures. The variables with the lowest means are related to the domain of state and economic institutions: fair and equal treatment of all groups (1.85), political influence in the world (1.89), the armed forces

⁷ The hubris variables are measured on a 5-point Likert scale, with the middle value (3) indicating neither agreement nor disagreement with a given survey item. I interpret mean values ranging from 2.5 to 3.5 as indicative of ambivalent attitudes.

(1.94), social security (1.93), economic achievements (2.01), and the way democracy works (2.08). In contrast, activities associated with the cultural heritage of the nation tend to receive higher scores, ranging from 2.57 for achievements in science and technology to 2.73 for achievements in sports, though none of these variables exceed the ambivalence threshold. This response pattern suggests that members of Class 2 make a clear distinction between the state and the nation, and hold the former in lower regard than the latter.

Members of Class 2 also score lower on the hubris, shame, and unconditional support variables than other respondents. They are the only ones to disagree with the statements that one should support one's country even if it is in the wrong (mean of 2.09) and that the world would be a better place if others were like one's own compatriots (2.08). They are also more likely than members of the other classes to feel ashamed of their country (1.97) and are ambivalent about preference for their own citizenship (2.61) and the notion that their country is better than most others (2.28).

Because of the low levels of attachment, pride, and hubris, as well as the inclusive definition of national identity among members of Class 2, I refer to the class as *critical nationalist*. In all likelihood, people who exhibit this pattern of responses are either negatively disposed toward their particular country of residence or are generally skeptical of the nation-state as an institution. Though it may be tempting to label members of this class as non-nationalist or even anti-nationalist, I stop short of this conclusion. We cannot rule out the possibility that some respondents in this class have positive feelings toward another country, perhaps because they hold multiple citizenships or aspire to reside elsewhere at some point in their lives. Furthermore, my use of the term "nationalism" does not entail judgments about the content of a particular

representation of the nation-state; rather, it assumes that all individuals have some subjective relationship to the nation-state, even if that relationship is negative.

Class 3: Populist nationalism. The pattern of responses in Class 3, which represents 21.16 percent of the sample, resembles critical nationalism in one respect—the markedly low scores on measures of national pride. Like critical nationalists, members of Class 3 make a clear distinction between the state and the nation and are not proud of the former. However, the similarities between the two classes stop there. Members of Class 3 feel stronger attachment to their region (3.12) and country (3.44) than critical or liberal nationalists and their attachment to the continent is less ambivalent (2.56) than that of critical nationalists. In sharp contrast to both critical and liberal nationalists, the definition of the nation-state’s social boundaries in Class 3 is decidedly ethnic, with nearly all measures of national identity scoring well in the upper ranges of the response scale, including ancestry (3.53), birth (3.77), and lifelong residence (3.69).⁸ Religion is the only identity variable to receive a weaker positive response, with a mean of 2.75, which suggests that members of this class differentiate between ethnic and religious criteria of national membership and view the latter as less relevant.

Finally, the responses to the hubris, shame, and unconditional loyalty variables among members of Class 3 are moderate, much like those of liberal nationalists (but not critical nationalists, who tend to have low hubris). The only measure with a low score is the (absence of) shame in some aspects of the country (2.07), which is consistent with the low pride scores for members of this class.

Because members of this class express strong national attachment, adhere to a restrictive definition of national identity, espouse a general lack of pride in the state and economy, and are

⁸ Prior research demonstrates that ethnic nationalists typically also place a high priority on elective aspects of national identity (Kunovich 2009). However, the opposite does not hold true: Civic nationalists favor elective criteria of national belonging while rejecting ascriptive criteria.

ambivalent on most measures of hubris, I refer to this class as *populist nationalist*. Populism entails identification with common people and opposition to the established power of political and economic elites (Jansen 2011), which is consistent with this class's positive valuation of the nation's achievements and simultaneous rejection of state and economic institutions. Although populism can in principle be combined with either liberal or conservative principles, its most prominent political manifestations in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have been decidedly conservative (Betz and Immerfall 1998; Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2003; Berezin 2009). The Tea Party movement in the United States, Austria's Freedom Party, and the League of Polish Families are only a few examples of recent political movements that have successfully combined populism with nativist sentiments. The populist label does not imply, however, that members of this class necessarily support radical political parties; it merely suggests that they exhibit a pattern of responses that is generally consistent with exclusionary varieties of populism.

Class 4: Ultrationalism. Members of Class 4, which comprises 17.96 percent of the sample, score higher than those in any other class on all but one of the nationalism items (they trail populist nationalists by 0.03 on the importance of language for national membership). Their response pattern is nearly a mirror opposite of liberal nationalists: they feel intense attachment to their region (3.41), country (3.72), and continent (2.93); they place great importance on all criteria of national belonging, including religion (3.07); they feel extremely proud of the nation-state's achievements in all domains (ranging from 2.99 for social security to 3.65 for history); and exhibit high hubris and unconditional support for their country, and low levels of shame (2.45). Because of the overall intensity of its members' attitudes, I refer to this class as *ultrationalist*.

What is particularly interesting about the four classes is that they cannot be easily arranged along a single continuum. On the national identity variables, for instance, liberal nationalism is similar to critical nationalism, while ultranationalism is similar (in terms of the relative pattern of means, not necessarily their magnitude) to populist nationalism. In both the liberal and critical nationalist classes the civic indicators are rated as much more important than the ethnic ones, while in the ultranationalist and populist classes all indicators other than religion (and to some extent, respect for law) receive similar scores. The same ordering of classes does not hold, however, for the other nationalism variables.

On the attachment variables, all four classes follow a similar pattern of means, with attachment to the state scoring lower than attachment to the country, and attachment to the continent scoring lower than attachment to the state or the country. In contrast, on the measures of pride, critical nationalism shares a similar pattern of responses with populist nationalism, while liberal nationalism resembles ultranationalism. The exceptions to this are pride in the armed forces and history—here liberal and critical nationalism are more similar to one another, as are populist and ultranationalism. Finally, on the hubris measures, the pattern of means is similar in all four classes, as was the case for the attachment measures.

These response patterns demonstrate is that in terms of the meaning, the four classes are in fact crosscutting—on some variables, liberal and critical nationalism resemble one another, as do populist and ultranationalism, while on other variables liberal nationalism and ultranationalism have a similar pattern of responses, as do populist and critical nationalism; finally, on some aspects of nationalism, all four classes exhibit the same pattern of attitudes.

COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF SHARED UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE NATION-STATE

Equipped with a robust inductive typology of popular nationalism, we can now ask how the four varieties of the phenomenon are distributed within and across countries. It may be the case that some of the classes are present only in some countries; this is the distribution we would expect based on theories that unambiguously classify countries into distinct types of nationalism. A more uniform cross-national distribution of the classes would challenge such theories. It is also possible that some of the classes are specific to particular countries while others are prevalent in multiple settings.

The breakdown of classes by country is shown in Table 3. In addition to the country-specific class proportions, the table lists each country's index of qualitative variation (IQV), which measures the diversity of the class distribution on a scale from 0 (all observations fall into one class) to 1 (observations are equally distributed across the four classes) (Agresti and Agresti 1978).

The most important finding illustrated in Table 3 is that all of the classes are represented in every country in the sample, contrary to the prevalent view in the literature. The IQV falls below 0.8, indicating moderate concentration, only in four countries: Australia (0.787), Canada (0.796), Slovakia (0.788), and the United States (0.799). Even in these moderately concentrated cases, however, the most prevalent class comprises less than 60 percent of the population (liberal nationalism in Australia and Canada, critical nationalism in Slovakia, and ultranationalism in the U.S.) and the second-most prevalent class comprises no more than 35 percent of the population (ultranationalism in Australia and Canada at 22.95 percent and 27.17 percent, respectively, populist nationalism in Slovakia at 26.54 percent, and liberal nationalism

Table 3. Distribution of latent classes by country, ISSP 2003 full data^a.

	Liberal (%)	Critical (%)	Populist (%)	Ultra (%)	N	IQV
Total	36.33	24.30	21.36	18.01		
Australia ^b	58.56	11.98	6.84	22.61	1,477	0.78
Austria	40.39	12.61	12.91	34.08	666	0.92
Canada	48.79	7.28	9.97	33.96	742	0.84
Chile	26.22	9.94	30.68	33.16	1,167	0.96
Czech Republic	18.08	40.45	37.06	4.41	885	0.89
Denmark	52.22	18.11	12.00	17.67	900	0.87
Spain	47.94	21.28	11.33	19.45	874	0.90
Finland	53.72	22.44	11.76	12.08	927	0.84
France	53.83	20.98	14.87	10.32	901	0.84
Great Britain	48.29	23.76	12.36	15.59	526	0.89
Germany	36.59	44.93	12.71	5.78	779	0.86
Hungary	36.76	20.73	32.07	10.44	661	0.94
Ireland	46.62	12.73	9.74	30.91	770	0.88
Japan	41.26	28.29	13.98	16.47	601	0.94
South Korea	14.90	46.47	31.57	7.05	1,134	0.88
Netherlands	52.71	34.29	8.39	4.61	1,216	0.79
Norway	48.88	24.00	13.85	13.27	1,025	0.89
New Zealand	50.39	11.30	14.44	23.86	637	0.87
Philippines	14.12	9.32	49.62	26.93	1,062	0.87
Poland	13.18	32.39	47.05	7.39	880	0.87
Portugal	25.62	26.67	36.48	11.24	1,050	0.96
South Africa	32.37	15.67	17.24	34.72	1,653	0.96
Russia	10.87	34.85	47.66	6.62	1,389	0.85
Slovenia	32.03	36.30	25.98	5.69	843	0.93
Switzerland	52.68	31.09	4.59	11.64	653	0.81
Slovakia	14.09	54.39	27.83	3.70	866	0.81
Sweden	48.06	35.88	11.38	4.69	747	0.83
Uruguay	20.03	24.28	36.55	19.15	799	0.97
USA	34.38	4.42	9.05	52.16	928	0.80
Venezuela	15.79	6.88	32.56	44.77	1,032	0.89
N	9,813	6,638	6,184	5,155	27,790	

^a Values for each countries are shaded in descending order, with darkest cells representing higher values and lighter cells representing lower values; Ns are weighted with sample weights but not population weights.

in the U.S. at 34.41 percent). Furthermore, the probability that any two randomly selected respondents from one of these three countries will espouse different models of the nation-state is quite high, ranging from 0.591 in Australia and Slovakia to 0.599 in the U.S.⁹

The second striking feature of the results is the pattern formed by the most prevalent classes, represented by cells with the darkest shading in the table. Wealthy, established

⁹ These figures are based on an unstandardized IQV, which was omitted from the table.

democracies have the highest concentration of liberal nationalism (greater than 40 percent in fourteen out of eighteen cases), while most Eastern European countries are characterized by a high prevalence of critical and populist varieties of nationalism (ranging from 21.99 to 56.6 percent for critical and 25.86 to 48.97 percent for populist) and former Spanish colonies share a high concentration of populist nationalism (between 29.65 and 48.19 percent).

Despite these patterns, it would be a mistake to give into the methodological nationalist temptation and categorize countries based solely on their most prevalent classes. Table 3 reveals multiple exceptions to the patterns described above. For instance, although the wealthiest of the established democratic countries, the United States, has a high number of liberal nationalists (34.41 percent), its most prevalent class is ultranationalism (52.16 percent). Also, a number of newer and less wealthy democracies are found among countries with a high prevalence of liberal nationalism (e.g., Hungary at 35.33 percent, Slovenia at 32.98 percent, and South Africa at 32.37 percent), while non-Eastern-European countries feature among those with the highest prevalence of critical nationalism (e.g., Germany at 44 percent and South Korea at 46.3 percent).

A second reason to avoid classifying countries based on the most prevalent class is that doing so would ignore the within-country variation captured by the LCA. For instance, although liberal nationalists are most common in both Ireland and the Netherlands, the second most prevalent class in Ireland is ultranationalism (27.71 percent), while in the Netherlands it is critical nationalism (34.69 percent). Similarly, populist nationalism is the most prevalent class in both Uruguay (36.11 percent) and the Philippines (48.19 percent), but the second most prevalent class in Uruguay is critical nationalism (24 percent), while in the Philippines it is ultranationalism (28.77 percent). These are not trivial differences and they would be lost if countries were characterized by their modal classes.

Table 4. Unconditional multilevel model of class assignment, ISSP 2003 full data.

	Liberal	Critical	Populist	Ultra
Country intercept	-2.645	-7.566	-7.394	-13.268
Within-country variance	40.693	99.987	68.848	185.052
Between-country variance	5.866	18.748	9.694	29.054
Intra-class correlation	0.126	0.158	0.123	0.136

To get a more precise estimate of the magnitude of within-country heterogeneity in the sample, I analyzed the data using unconditional multilevel models predicting the individual-level probability of belonging to each class. Because the distribution of the probabilities is bimodal and bounded at 0 and 1, the probabilities were logit-transformed. The models decompose the variance within the dependent variable into between- and within-country components. The results are shown in Table 4.

The quantity of interest is the intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC), which measures the proportion of the total variance in the dependent variable that is found between higher-level units, in this case countries. The ICCs for the four classes range from 0.123 to 0.158, meaning that between 84.2 and 87.7 percent of the variance is observed within countries. The fact that attitudes toward the nation are more heterogeneous within countries than between them provides additional evidence against theories of nationalism that characterize countries as internally-homogeneous units of analysis.¹⁰

PREDICTING ADHERENCE TO VARIETIES OF POPULAR NATIONALISM

Thus far, I have identified the four shared representations of the nation-state in the pooled sample and described their distribution across countries. The next task is to determine what characteristics predict adherence to each of these cultural models. As the variance decomposition suggests, class membership varies across both individuals and countries, so a

¹⁰ It should be noted that the unconditional decomposition of variance tells us little about the extent to which its within- and between-unit components can be explained using individual- and country-level attributes. Without explicitly modeling the variance with observable data we cannot know how much of it (at either level) is due to systematic differences between observations as opposed to random variation.

predictive model must take both levels of analysis into account. Given that regular OLS regression models of nested data tend to underestimate the magnitude of standard errors, the best method for disentangling the multilevel effects is hierarchical linear modeling (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).

The results of the analysis are presented in Table 5. The effects are reported in the form of odds ratios. All independent variables are unstandardized, so that each coefficient represents the impact of a single unit change in the independent variable on the odds ratio of assignment to class C_i over assignment to class C_j . For instance, for people who are married, the odds of adhering to liberal nationalism are 1.21 times greater than the odds of adhering to critical nationalism, controlling for the other covariates. Furthermore, the categorical variables in the models are uncentered, while age is centered on the group means; consequently, the intercepts in the models should be interpreted as averages of group-specific odds of the outcome (relative to the omitted outcome category) when all the categorical independent variables are held at zero and age is held at its group-specific mean. The odds of belonging to the liberal class, for instance, are on average¹¹ 1.599 times greater than the odds of belonging to the critical class for a non-married female who has a high school diploma but no post-secondary degree, does not regularly attend religious services, does not live in an urban area, and has at least one parent who was not a citizen of the country at the time of the respondent's birth. Understanding the hypothetical respondent's age is somewhat trickier: the 1.599 odds ratio is a mean of separate intercepts calculated individually for all the countries in the sample, with each country-specific

¹¹ The modifier "on average" is crucial here. The algorithm does not simply set the categorical variables to zero and calculate the intercept, as would be the case in a standard OLS regression. Instead, it calculates separate intercepts for the thirty countries (one model per country) by setting the categorical variables *in each country* to zero and then reports the mean value of the thirty country-specific intercepts.

Table 5. Random intercept and coefficient multilevel regression of latent class assignment on individual-level attributes, including political affiliation, ISSP 2003.^a

	Lib/Crit	Lib/Pop	Lib/Ultra	Crit/Pop	Crit/Ultra	Pop/Ultra
<i>Fixed effects (individual-level predictors)^b</i>						
Intercept	1.310	7.258***	6.328***	5.466***	4.830***	0.867
Party: right-wing	1.518**	0.833	0.711**	0.548***	0.468***	0.855
Age	1.003	0.983***	0.970***	0.979***	0.967***	0.987**
Male	1.109	1.192	1.026	1.074	0.924	0.859
Married	1.304**	1.084	1.163*	0.829*	0.891	1.074*
Education: low	0.954	0.531***	0.557***	0.558***	0.585***	1.048
Education: high	0.759**	1.480**	1.597***	1.954***	2.108***	1.084
Religiosity	1.342**	0.950	0.775**	0.708**	0.577***	0.817*
Community: urban	1.009	1.086	1.204**	1.076	1.192*	1.111
Parents citizens	1.039	0.356***	0.500**	0.347***	0.480**	1.405
Individual-level N	17,060	17,060	17,060	17,060	17,060	17,060
Country-level N	28	28	28	28	28	28

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

^a All results are reported as odds ratios. The outcome in each column consists of the comparison of the odds of assignment to the first latent class versus assignment to the second latent class. For instance, the results in the “Lib/Crit” column compare the impact of the independent variables on the odds of being a liberal nationalist versus the odds of being a critical nationalist.

^b Omitted categories: female, non-married, mid-level education (i.e., “Above lowest qualification” or “Higher secondary completed”), attends religious services less than once a month, rural or small town community, parents not citizens.

intercept representing the effect for a (hypothetical) respondent whose age is set to the country-specific mean (and who has values of zero on all the categorical variables in the model).

The results of the multilevel models make it possible to develop a general demographic profile for each of the four classes. Liberal nationalists tend to be younger than populistnationalists and ultranationalists (but do not differ in age from critical nationalists)¹²; they are more likely to be married than members of the other three classes; they tend to be more

¹² A more precise way to describe these effects is to say that being younger increases the odds of being a liberal nationalist relative to the odds of being a populist nationalist or ultranationalist, but being younger does increase the odds of being a liberal nationalist relative to the odds of being a critical nationalist. For the sake of brevity and intelligibility, however, I frame my interpretation in terms of the sociodemographic composition of each class, rather than the impact of sociodemographic variables on the odds of latent class membership. The distinction is a subtle one, but should be kept in mind, in order not to confuse the direction of the causal relationships. The assumption in these models is that nationalism does not change a person’s age, for instance, but that age has an impact on the person’s conceptions of the nation-state (the validity of the causal assumptions in the models is more debatable for some of the other covariates). Furthermore, the effects tell us nothing about the relative proportions of particular types of respondents within a particular class—they only indicate that particular types of respondents are over- or underrepresented in the class, net of other covariates. Thus, when I say that liberal nationalists are less likely to be religious than ultranationalists, this is shorthand for stating that religious people are underrepresented among liberal nationalists or overrepresented among ultranationalists. In this scenario, it is still possible for religious people to constitute a minority of both groups, depending on the overall distribution of religious people in sample.

educated than populist nationalists and ultranationalists but less educated than critical nationalists; they are less likely to be religious than ultranationalists but more likely to be religious than critical nationalists (their religiosity does not differ from that of populist nationalists); they are more likely to live in urban centers than ultranationalists (but urban residence does not distinguish them from critical and populist nationalists); finally, the likelihood that one of their parents was a non-citizens at the time of the respondents' birth are greater than those for populist nationalists or ultranationalists (but they are no different in this respect from critical nationalists).

Critical nationalists have characteristics similar to liberal nationalists. They are also younger, better educated, and more likely to have immigrant backgrounds than populist nationalists or ultranationalists, and they too are more likely to live in urban centers than ultranationalists. They are no more likely, however, than populist nationalists—and less likely than liberal nationalists—to be married. Furthermore, they are much less likely than either populist nationalists or ultranationalists to be religious. Religiosity is also a major point of difference between critical nationalists and liberal nationalists: attending religious services once a month or more increases the odds of being liberal rather than critical nationalist by a factor of 1.244. Finally, critical nationalists are more educated than liberal nationalists: having a high level of education (college or higher) decreases the odds of being liberal rather than critical nationalist by a factor of 0.784.

The characteristics of populist nationalists—the third class in the analysis—can be partly inferred from the preceding discussion: they tend to be older, less educated, and more likely to have parents who are citizens compared to liberal and critical nationalists. They are less likely to be married than liberal nationalists (but not critical nationalists) and are more likely to be

religious than critical nationalists (but not liberal nationalists). They share many attributes with ultranationalists, but there are also some distinctions between these classes. Being older decreases the odds of adhering to populist nationalism relative to the odds of adhering to ultranationalism, as does having a high level of religiosity. Living in an urban center, on the other hand, has a positive effect on populist nationalism compared to ultranationalism.

Finally, I turn to the ultranationalist class. Compared to liberal, critical, and populist nationalists, ultranationalists tend to be older, more religious, and more likely to live outside of urban centers. They tend to be less educated than liberal and critical nationalists and more likely than them to have parents who are citizens (they do not differ from populist nationalists on these variables). They are also less likely than liberal nationalists to be married.

To ensure that the four shared representations of the nation are not mere statistical artifacts, I used them to predict attitudes toward immigrants measured by the ISSP. The survey asks respondents whether immigrants increase crime rates, damage the economy, take jobs away from people born in the country, and enrich the country's culture, as well as whether the government spends too much money assisting immigrants and whether the number of immigrants admitted into the country should be reduced. I recoded and dichotomized the responses to these six variables, so that positive values indicated anti-immigrant attitudes. The variables were then used to construct an additive scale of anti-immigrant sentiment. The Cronbach's alpha for the scale was 0.73, which indicates a moderate level of reliability.

I regressed the scale of anti-immigrant attitudes on dummy indicators of the four shared representations of the nation (with liberal nationalism as the omitted variable), along with individual-level controls for age, gender, marital status, education, religiosity, citizen parents, and occupation. The analysis was carried out using hierarchical linear modeling. Because the

Table 6. Random intercept and coefficient multilevel regression of anti-immigrant attitude scale on class assignment and controls, ISSP 2003 full sample^a.

Attitudinal profile	Coefficient	Standard error	T-ratio	Degrees of freedom	P-value
Critical	-0.052	0.055	0.958	29	0.347
Populist	1.034	0.111	9.283	29	0.000
Ultra	0.714	0.091	7.813	29	0.000
Intercept	2.256	0.103	21.995	29	0.000
Within-country variance explained	0.174				

^a The model includes controls for age, gender, marital status, education, religiosity, citizen parents, and occupation (not shown).

sources of cross-national variation in immigrant attitudes were not the focus of the analysis, no country-level covariates were included in the models.

The results of the analysis, presented in Table 6, demonstrate that adherence to the four classes is a strong predictor of anti-immigrant attitudes, even when sociodemographic controls are included in the model. Clearly, the classes are not mere statistical artifacts, nor are they epiphenomenal reflections of other underlying individual-level characteristics. Furthermore, the magnitudes and signs of the coefficients are consistent with what could be expected based on the earlier descriptions of the attitudinal classes. Populist nationalists and ultranationalists espouse more anti-immigrant sentiments than liberal nationalists, while critical nationalists are less anti-immigrant than liberal nationalists. The same results held when self-reported political ideology (liberal vs. conservative) was included in the models (results are available upon request), which suggests that shared representations of the nation-state structure people's immigration views independently of political ideology. A similar analysis could be performed for a variety of other attitudes related to nationalism, such as cultural and economic policy preferences or views on international organizations and globalization.

POPULAR NATIONALISM AND CULTURAL CHANGE

I begin the analysis of change in nationalist attitudes by identifying shared representations of the nation-state independently in the 1995 and 2003 pooled samples and then examining their

distribution within countries. The distinction between the content and distribution of the cultural models constitutes two axes of temporal variation. First, it is possible that the cultural repertoires through which people understand their nation-states vary in content over time. For instance, at one time, inclusive views of national identity may be associated with low hubris, while at another time they may be coupled with extreme values on the hubris indicators. It is also possible, however, that the conceptual terrain of nationalist attitudes is relatively fixed over time and the same types of nationalism are found in both the 1995 and 2003 samples.

Furthermore, independent of their content, the distribution of shared representations of the nation-state between and within countries may or may not change over the same time period. The interaction between these two forms of variation—in the content and the distribution of cultural models—produces four distinct trajectories of change that may be observed in the data. These scenarios are presented in Table 7, with content represented by the rows of the table and distribution represented by the columns. The cells describe the implications of the change trajectory for nationalism theory, with reference to existing literature.

The upper-left cell of the table indicates stability in both the content and distribution of nationalist attitudes, which corresponds to the assumptions of the classic ethnic-civic approach to nationalism: that the attributes of the two varieties of nationalism are fixed over time and that countries can be permanently classified as belonging to one category or the other. In contrast, the upper-right cell of the table presents a scenario in which the content of the types of nationalism is stable, but their distribution within countries changes. This change trajectory corresponds to the multiple-traditions approach of Rogers Smith (1988, 1997), which traces the waxing and waning of nativist and inclusive tendencies in American citizenship law over time.

Table 7. Possible relationships between the content of popular understandings of the nation and their distribution across countries.

	Stable distribution	Unstable distribution
Stable content	Countries can be classified based on the relative prevalence of a fixed set of ideas and their classification is stable over time (e.g., Kohn 1944)	The prevalence of a fixed set of ideas fluctuates over time within countries, precluding a stable classification of countries (e.g., R. Smith 1997)
Unstable content	Ideas change over time, but the grouping of countries that adhere to the same set of ideas is fixed over time, making it possible to assign countries to stable categories	Ideas change over time, as does their distribution, making it impossible to generate a fixed typology of popular nationalism or to assign countries to stable categories

In contrast to the ethnic-civic model, the dynamic nature of nationalism in this scenario makes it difficult to assign countries to distinct nationalist camps.

The possibility that unstable belief structures may have a stable distribution, reflected in the bottom-left cell of the table, may seem counterintuitive. If we shift the emphasis, however, from the content of ideas to the question of which countries share a similar set of definitions of the nation-state, whatever those definitions may entail, then this scenario becomes plausible. It is possible that regardless of what the particular bases of the comparison are, cross-sectional snapshots of variation in nationalist attitudes taken at two different times will yield the same grouping of countries. For instance, it may be the case that the precise criteria on which ethnic and civic nationalism are based have changed over time, but that the same countries consistently subscribe to more (or less inclusive) criteria of national belonging.

Finally, the bottom-right cell captures a scenario in which no lasting pattern can be observed in the content or the distribution of understandings of the nation-state: ideas change over time, as does their prevalence across countries. It is certainly conceivable that a comparison


of the 1995 and 2003 data may yield this pattern of attitudes, but such an outcome would not be consistent with any of the past comparative theories of nationalism.

The availability of the two ISSP National Identity supplements enables me to test which of these scenarios best represents change in popular conceptions of the nation-state over an eight-year period (or a nine- or ten-year period for some countries, depending on when the data in each wave were collected). While this temporal window is a small one, it overlaps with significant political, economic, and social developments in many of the countries in the sample, including post-Communist transitions in Eastern Europe, major terrorist attacks in the U.S., Russia, and the Philippines, and economic recessions in Germany, the Netherlands, and Japan. If either the content or the distribution of shared representations of the nation-state is indeed variable, we should expect to observe changes in the data brought on by these events.

To examine change over time, I repeated the earlier analyses using the 1995 wave of the ISSP, as well as a subsample of the 2003 data restricted to the twenty countries included in the 1995 wave. I applied the LCA algorithm independently to the two waves of data, imposing no constraints on the results for each wave. One of the nationalism questions – the importance of ancestry for national identity – was not asked in 1995, so I omitted it from the 2003 comparative sample.

Figure 3 present the means for the nationalism variables by class, with each of the four classes plotted separately. The lines in the graphs correspond to the two comparison samples and the full 2003 sample. As the figure demonstrates, the content of the four types of nationalism is strikingly similar in the 1995 and 2003 comparison samples, which suggests that people drew on the same repertoire of shared representations of the nation-state in the two time points, despite the various economic, political, and cultural transformations that took place in the ensuing eight

Figure 3. Means of nationalism variables by latent class, 1995-2003.^a



^a **Attachment:** cont = continent, ctry = country, prov = province; **Identity:** relig = religion, live = life-long residence, resp = respect for laws/institutions, lang = language, feel = subjective feeling, citiz = citizenship, brth = birth, ance = ancestry; **Pride:** art = art/literature, demo = democracy, econ = economy, grps = treatment of groups, hist = history, armf = armed forces, poli = political status, scit = science/technology, sprt = sports, socs = social security; **Hubris:** peop = better people, ctry = better country, citiz = preference for own citizenship; **Other:** sham = shame in country, ifwr = support country even if wrong.

years. Turning back to the four possible change scenarios in Table 7, the results are consistent with the two cells in the top row. If the distribution of the classes within countries turns out to remain largely the same, then the stability assumption of Kohn and A.D. Smith will be validated. If, however, the distribution changes, then it will be possible to reject the stability assumption in favor of R. Smith's multiple traditions theory.

The similarity of the nationalism variable means in the 1995 and 2003 comparison samples also provides evidence for the robustness of the latent class method. Had the LCA models not produced valid and reliable measurements of attitudinal clustering, it would not have been possible to generate nearly identical sets of classes from two completely independent samples, regardless if the true nationalist attitudes were stable or not. Additionally, the fact that the deletion of ten countries from the full 2003 sample did not have a major impact on the content of the classes in the reduced 2003 sample further confirms the reliability of the method and the stability of the generated classes. The robustness of the results to changes in the selection of countries used to identify the latent classes is consistent with the observation that most of the variation in nationalist attitudes is in fact found within countries.

Having established that the content of the four types of nationalism is stable, I turn to an analysis of their distribution within countries over time. Table 8 presents the breakdown of the attitudinal profiles by country in 1995 and 2003. The countries are sorted in descending order by the magnitude of the observed changes across the two time periods, measured as the country-specific Euclidian distance between the vectors of the class proportions in 1995 and 2003 (the statistical significance of the changes is captured by the p-values in the last column of the table).

The results demonstrate that most countries experienced significant shifts in the distribution of the classes over the eight-year period, which directly contradicts the stability

Table 8. Distribution of the four types of nationalism by country, 1995-2003.^a

	1995						2003						Euclidian Distance (All classes)	P-value (χ^2 test)
	Liberal (%)	Critical (%)	Populist (%)	Ultra (%)	N	IQV	Liberal (%)	Critical (%)	Populist (%)	Ultra (%)	N	IQV		
Total	41.85	19.18	19.77	19.21			36.78	22.46	21.44	19.32			6.27	<0.001
Hungary	12.75	35.09	46.51	5.65	600	0.85	36.32	20.18	32.97	10.53	661	0.94	31.38	<0.001
USA	41.68	4.56	10.60	43.16	943	0.84	25.05	3.34	9.08	62.53	928	0.72	25.60	<0.001
Netherlands	72.34	14.71	5.91	7.04	1,421	0.60	56.63	27.37	10.16	5.83	1,216	0.79	20.65	<0.001
Ireland	43.68	4.87	7.38	44.07	705	0.81	49.80	13.17	7.38	29.65	770	0.86	17.73	<0.001
Canada	60.27	7.99	4.89	26.85	1,070	0.74	48.80	5.29	9.86	36.04	742	0.83	15.75	<0.001
Germany	51.31	27.62	8.25	12.82	1,183	0.85	42.73	38.62	11.52	7.13	779	0.87	15.42	<0.001
Norway	56.16	7.83	12.42	23.59	958	0.81	51.61	19.61	13.66	15.12	1,025	0.87	15.26	<0.001
Spain	44.01	25.08	18.46	12.45	884	0.93	50.16	19.15	10.18	20.51	874	0.88	14.37	<0.001
Russia	16.67	39.60	37.21	6.52	884	0.90	10.37	34.58	48.74	6.30	1389	0.84	14.07	<0.001
Japan	50.87	16.13	8.56	24.44	806	0.86	43.43	24.46	13.81	18.30	601	0.93	13.78	<0.001
Slovakia	16.18	44.15	30.06	9.60	958	0.91	14.03	54.84	27.58	3.55	866	0.80	12.71	<0.001
Slovenia	24.97	29.38	34.76	10.90	725	0.96	34.88	29.66	28.71	6.76	843	0.94	12.33	<0.001
Philippines	22.55	13.09	43.10	21.26	1,023	0.93	15.75	9.04	46.82	28.40	1,062	0.89	11.29	<0.001
Australia	52.42	6.09	14.69	26.81	1,675	0.84	49.70	9.21	7.31	33.78	1,477	0.83	10.96	<0.001
Czech Rep.	24.61	29.58	38.60	7.20	714	0.93	21.29	38.15	35.51	5.04	885	0.91	9.93	0.002
Poland	17.60	37.81	37.21	7.37	815	0.91	17.02	32.06	43.93	6.99	880	0.89	8.87	0.024
Sweden	49.91	23.73	19.35	7.01	826	0.87	50.60	28.78	14.19	6.43	747	0.85	7.28	0.030
Great Britain	46.83	17.48	15.23	20.46	629	0.91	51.35	18.32	12.21	18.12	526	0.87	5.98	0.244
New Zealand	51.20	6.47	12.80	29.54	711	0.84	47.41	9.89	14.29	28.41	637	0.89	5.44	0.088
Austria	35.62	8.88	14.74	40.75	649	0.90	37.09	9.37	12.73	40.80	666	0.89	2.54	0.098
N	7,608	3,487	3,593	3,491	18,179		6,464	3,948	3,767	3,394	17,574			

^a Values for each countries are shaded in descending order, with darkest cells representing higher values and lighter cells representing lower values; Ns are weighted with sample weights but not population weights.

assumption and supports the multiple traditions perspective captured in the upper-right cell of Table 7. The magnitude of the shifts varied considerably across countries, however, with some countries experiencing major changes in the prevalence of the four classes and others experiencing little to no change. In Hungary, for instance, the prevalence of liberal nationalism increased by 23.57 percentage points, while critical nationalism declined by 14.91 points and populist nationalism dropped by 13.54 points. In contrast, in the U.S. and Canada, liberal nationalism declined by 16.63 and 11.47 points, respectively, while ultranationalism increased by 19.37 and 9.19 points. The Netherlands also experienced a large drop in liberal nationalism (15.71 points), but this was accompanied by an increase of 12.66 points in critical nationalism and little change in ultranationalism. In Ireland, a pattern opposite to that in the U.S. Canada was observed, with liberal nationalism increasing by 6.12 points, critical nationalism increasing by 8.3 points, and ultranationalism declining by 14.42 points. Other cases with significant shifts in the prevalence of the attitudinal classes include Germany, Norway, Spain, Russia, Japan, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

At the other end of the Euclidian distance range—that is, at the bottom of Table 8—are countries where the distribution of the classes was relatively stable over time. In Austria, for instance, the largest observed changes were a 1.47 point increase in liberal nationalism and a 2.01 point decline in populist nationalism, while in New Zealand, liberal nationalism declined by a mere 3.79 points and critical nationalism increased by 3.42 points; none of these shifts were statistically significant. Other countries with relatively stable attitudinal profiles include Great Britain, Sweden, Poland, the Czech Republic, Australia, and the Philippines. Even among those countries, however, some significant shifts in individual classes can be observed (e.g., populist nationalism declined by 5.04 points in Sweden and increased by 6.72 in Poland).

It is possible to formulate post hoc explanations for these attitudinal fluctuations, with the American case perhaps being the most obvious: The decline of liberal nationalism and the dramatic increase in ultranationalism are likely to have been a result of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, which preceded the second wave of data collection. Many surveys have documented a rise in support for government officials and institutions (Huddy, Khatib, and Capelos 2002), allegiance to national symbols (Skitka 2005), and national pride (Smith, Rasinski, and Toce 2001) following 9/11, so it is reasonable to expect a concomitant shift in adherence to particular cultural models of the nation-state.

The Hungarian case is also understandable given the country's economic boom in the late 1990s, which saw dramatic increases in GDP (40.54 percent increase between 1995 and 2003), openness to trade (40 percent increase in trade as percentage of GDP), and government social expenditures (11 percent increase). Furthermore, in the years prior to 2003, Hungary completed most of the requirements for EU accession and held a referendum on the issue in April, 2003, one month after the ISSP data were collected. With increased economic stability, an expanded government safety net, and popular excitement surrounding EU accession, Hungarian citizens may have gained pride in their state and become less likely to view membership in their nation in restrictive terms. This would explain the marked increase in the prevalence of liberal nationalism. Of course, more exclusionary forms of nationalism did not disappear altogether in Hungary: The prevalence of populist nationalism remained moderately high, at 32.68 percent, while ultranationalism doubled from 4.67 to 11.20 percent. These figures may reflect a backlash against EU accession, perceived by a minority of the population as a looming threat to Hungarian culture and economic wellbeing (Beichelt 2004), as well as the persistence of fervently

xenophobic and traditionalist discourse among the country's conservative political parties (Vahudova 2008).

Similar accounts could be produced for other countries in the sample. However, in order to systematically evaluate which events are uniquely associated with particular attitudinal changes, we must simultaneously compare the presence and absence of all the events across all the cases. To do so, I rely on qualitative case analysis (QCA), a method developed by Charles Ragin (1987) for analyzing small-sample comparative data. QCA uses Boolean algebra to derive parsimonious combinations of predictors associated with the presence of a particular outcome, under the assumption that the outcome may result from multiple concurrent causal pathways. It treats explanatory factors as symmetrical, allowing the absence and not just the presence of attributes to have predictive power.

Because the method is only suitable for binary measures (cf. Ragin's [2000] fuzzy set method), I dichotomize all the continuous country attributes at their third quartiles (i.e., I code the five countries with the largest positive and negative changes on each measure as positive cases). The outcomes included in the analysis are the presence of a downward or upward change (separately) of at least five percentage points in the prevalence of each class, which yields two binary measures for each of the four classes.

The results of the QCA analysis are presented in Table 9. Each causal pathway consists of one or more attributes, with asterisks signifying the logical operator "AND." The multiple pathways toward a given outcome (i.e., table rows corresponding to a given outcome) are joined by the logical operator "OR." Predictors listed in upper case are present and those listed in lower case are absent. The arrows indicate an increase or decrease in the level of the predictor—or more precisely, they indicate that the corresponding cases are in the top quartile of the

Table 9. QCA results predicting shifts in class prevalence by country, ISSP 1995 and 2003 comparative samples^a.

	Outcome	Causal factors ^b	Cases covered	Unique coverage	Solution coverage
<i>Liberal</i>	Increase > 5 pts	GDP↑ * socexp↓ * terrorism	HUN, IRL, SLO	0.75	1.0
		CONSERV * econshock * immig↑	ESP	0.25	
	Decrease > 5 pts	ECONSHOCK	GER, JPN, NED	0.29	0.86
		TERROR * gdp↑	PHI, RUS, USA	0.29	
<i>Critical</i>	Increase > 5 pts	ECONSHOCK	GER, JPN, NED	0.13	0.88
		IMMIG↑ * CONSERV	IRL, NED, NOR	0.25	
		gdp↑ * POLSHOCK	CZE, GER, SVK	0.25	
	Decrease > 5 pts	GDP↑ * socexp↑ * immig↑	POL, RUS	0.5	0.75
		CONSERV * econshock * immig↑	ESP	0.25	
<i>Populist</i>	Increase > 5 pts	ECONSHOCK * SOCEXP↑	JPN	0.25	0.75
		GDP↑ * POLSHOCK * socexp↑	POL, RUS	0.5	
	Decrease > 5 pts	GDP↑ * SOCEXP↑	HUN, SLO	0.4	0.8
SOCEXP↑ * econshock * polshock		AUS	0.2		
CONSERV * econshock * immig↑		ESP	0.2		
<i>Ultra</i>	Increase > 5 pts	IMMIG↑ * conserv	AUS	0.17	0.67
		TERROR * gdp↑	USA, PHI	0.33	
		CONSERV * econshock * immig↑	ESP	0.33	
	Decrease > 5 pts	ECONSHOCK * socexp↓	GER, JPN	0.2	1.0
IMMIG↑ * CONSERV * econshock		IRL, NOR	0.4		
gdp↑ * socexp↑ * POLSHOCK		GER, SVK	0.2		

^a Variable legend: **conserv** = conservative political turn (i.e., electoral success of conservative party prior to second wave of data in cases where liberal party was in power during first wave of data), **gdp** = GDP per capita, **econshock** = economic shock (i.e., recession before second wave of data, but not before first wave), **immig** = increased salience of immigration issues in media and political campaigns between two waves of data collection, **polshock** = political shock (i.e., regime change in the years leading up to either survey wave, which is equivalent to a post-communism dummy), **socexp** = social expenditures (% of GDP), **terror** = significant increase in terrorism-related casualties between two waves of data collection.

^b Capital letters indicate the presence of a predictor and lower case letters indicate its absence. Asterisks in the solutions represent logical AND operators. Multiple solutions for each outcome are complementary and should thus be interpreted as joined by logical OR operators.

negative/positive change scores for that attribute. Any given attribute may be increasing (e.g., SOCEXP↑), decreasing (e.g., SOCEXP↓), not increasing (e.g., socexp↑), or not decreasing (e.g., socexp↓). Binary attributes, such as economic shocks, political shocks, and EU accession, are not accompanied by arrows since they are either present or absent. Thus, for instance, an increase in liberal nationalism may be a result of either an increase in GDP along with a decrease in social expenditures and the absence of a terrorist attack or of an electoral victory of a

conservative party in the absence of an economic shock and rise in the public salience of immigration.

The results suggest that national security shocks, economic booms and recessions, increased salience of immigration issues, and conservative electoral successes were associated with changes in the relative prevalence of the four popular representations of the nation-state in the twenty countries in the sample.

The prominence of the first of those factors, threats to national security, in the results confirms the earlier intuition regarding the U.S. case: the large drop in liberal nationalism and increase in ultranationalism were associated with the terrorist attacks of 9/11. However, the U.S. was not the only country to experience terrorism between 1995 and 2003. Although no other single event produced as many casualties as the attacks on the World Trade Center, the total number of terrorism-related deaths also increased considerably in the Philippines and Russia. In the Philippines, the Islamist separatist group Abu Sayyaf launched repeated attacks between 1999 and 2003 that killed nearly 200 people and injured hundreds more, while in Russia, Chechen separatists intensified their militant campaign against civilians, most notably in the Moscow hostage crisis that resulted in 170 deaths (GTD 2009).

Though the shift away from liberal nationalism and toward ultranationalism took place in all three countries affected by terrorism, the effect was much smaller in Russia than in the Philippines or the United States: liberal nationalism declined in Russia by 5.02 percentage points, putting it just above the threshold for inclusion in the model, while ultranationalism did not increase in the country at all. The QCA results suggest that what set the Russian case apart was its high level of economic growth, which may have offset the effects of the terrorist attacks. Another possible explanation for the lack of significant upward movement in ultranationalism is

the perceived mishandling of the terrorist threat by Russian authorities, which may have dampened people's pride in state institutions. The vast majority of the casualties in the 2002 Moscow hostage crisis were caused by the decision of government security forces to pump toxic gas into the theater (Javeline and Baird 2007; Scheppele 2009). In contrast, government responses to 9/11 in the U.S. and the Abu Sayyaf attacks in the Philippines met with widespread public support.

An alternative explanation for the discrepancies between the Russian case and the U.S. and Philippines may also help account for the shift from liberal nationalism to ultranationalism in Canada. It is possible that the attitudinal changes in the Philippines were not a result of domestic terrorism, which had been part of Filipinos' everyday reality for over two decades, but rather of a spillover effect of 9/11. The Philippine government has long enjoyed a close diplomatic relationship with the U.S. and many Filipinos have strong affinities toward Americans, which date back to the liberation of the Philippines from Japanese occupation in 1945 and are reinforced by the presence of a large Filipino diaspora in the U.S (Banlaoi 2002; cf. Go 2008). Furthermore, Filipinos may have perceived the 9/11 attacks as a manifestation of the same terrorist movement that had long afflicted their country. It is possible that these factors caused Filipinos to respond to 9/11 in a similar manner to Americans, by rallying around their government and shifting toward a more exclusive conception of their nation's social boundaries.

A similar penumbra effect of the 9/11 attacks may have operated in the Canadian case, given that the U.S. is Canada's immediate neighbor, closest ally, and largest trading partner. These institutional links are further strengthened by the two countries' cultural similarity and high volume of cross-border migration. These factors contributed to the resonance of 9/11 among the Canadian public, which was reflected in widespread feelings of solidarity with the

American people.¹³ The factors relevant in the Canadian and Philippine cases were absent in Russia, which may explain its divergent outcomes.

Besides national security shocks, another factor shaping many of the changes in the distribution of the varieties of popular nationalism between 1995 and 2003 was economic growth and decline. Large increases in GDP were associated with higher levels of liberal nationalism and lower levels of critical and populist nationalism, though only when economic growth was accompanied by other economic and political factors. Liberal nationalism increased when the positive effect of GDP growth was not offset by cuts to social expenditures and terrorist attacks (conditions that were met in Hungary, Ireland, and Slovenia), critical nationalism decreased in countries where social expenditures did not rise and immigration did not become a salient public issue (i.e., Poland and Russia), and populist nationalism declined when GDP growth was combined with a rise in social expenditures (in Hungary and Slovenia). In contrast, the prevalence of populist nationalism *increased* when GDP growth was not accompanied by higher government social expenditures (in Poland and Russia, two countries that had experienced a major political shock).

Based on these cases, it appears that pride in state and economic institutions, which characterizes liberal nationalism, increases when economic growth is combined with greater levels of government support for social programs. Presumably, without a rise in social expenditures, economic growth is seen by liberal and populist nationalists as benefitting wealthy

¹³ This possibility would have been missed by the QCA analysis (or any quantitative analysis for that matter) because 9/11 was not classified as a terrorist attack that took place in Canada (even though a number of Canadian nationals working in the U.S. were among the fatalities). In this explanation of the Philippine and Canadian cases, terrorism continues to be the primary factor associated with the observed attitude changes, even though the attacks occurred outside the borders of the two countries. This suggests the possibility that in some cases, popular attitudes respond not only to domestic events, but also to events that take place in countries to which the focal nation has strong ties. To directly test this possibility, it would be necessary to specify a more complex model that took into consideration cross-national network effects. Such an analysis is outside of the scope of this project, but is an intriguing possibility for future research. Consequently, the explanation of the Philippine and Canadian cases should be viewed as merely suggestive rather than conclusive.

elites rather than the general population. Indeed, as the Australian case demonstrates, even in the absence of major economic growth, a rise in social expenditures can result in a decline of populist nationalism, provided that the country does not experience a major political shock and is not in a recession.

Attitudinal change unfolded differently in periods of economic turmoil than it did in periods of economic growth. Economic recession was a sufficient cause for decreases in liberal nationalism and increases in critical nationalism, regardless of what happened to social expenditures (this was the case in Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands). Furthermore, increases in social spending during an economic recession, observed in the Japanese case, generated higher levels of populist nationalism, which likely reflected popular dissatisfaction with high government expenditures in times that called for economic austerity (it is possible that a similar effect would be observed in the U.S. after 2008, which could partly explain the rise of the populist Tea Party). Recessions not accompanied by cuts to social expenditures resulted in lower levels of ultranationalism (in Germany and Japan), presumably because former ultranationalists shifted toward populist nationalism, characterized by lower pride in state and economic institutions.

In Slovakia and Germany, a drop in ultranationalism and a concomitant rise in critical nationalism stemmed not from a full-blown recession but rather from the lack of significant economic growth combined with the lack of increase in social expenditures. A similar set of factors also resulted in an increase in critical nationalism in the Czech Republic. The fact that this pattern was observed in countries that had experienced major political transformations suggests a possible explanation. In all likelihood, many Slovaks and Czechs had expected the post-communist transition to produce a major economic boom and an improvement in the

welfare of the population; when this did not occur, pride in state and economic institutions declined and the prevalence of critical nationalism increased.

Though national security threats and macro-economic events were responsible for many of the changes in the relative salience of the four varieties of nationalism between 1995 and 2003, these factors do not explain all of the observed temporal variation. Another major cause of the attitudinal shifts was the increased public salience of immigration. Fervent public debates about immigration combined with the electoral successes of conservative political parties resulted in an increase in critical nationalism in Ireland, the Netherlands, and Norway. The liberal parties that were in power in all three countries in the late 1990s and early 2000s were seen by many citizens as overly permissive of continued immigration, which led to the rise of alternative populist political movements, like Pim Fortuyn's List in the Netherlands, the Progress Party in Norway, and the Immigration Control Platform in Ireland. The fact that these movements contributed to the electoral victories of conservative parties in the early 2000s likely resulted in the greater disaffection with state institutions among some politically liberal citizens, which in turn produced an increase in critical nationalism in all three cases.

The increased public salience of immigration accompanied by electoral victories by conservative political parties also resulted in lower levels of ultranationalism in Norway and Ireland (but immigration led to an increase in ultranationalism in Australia in the absence of conservative victories). A reduction in the intensity of xenophobic fervor in the general population following the incorporation of xenophobic movements into the formal political process is consistent with the work of Koopmans and colleagues (Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, and Passy 2005), who find an inverse relationship between extreme right-wing party strength and ethnic violence. When xenophobic movements are able to pursue their goals through

mainstream party politics, they tend to devote less time and effort to less conventional tactics that require grassroots mobilization. Thus mainstream politics can serve as a “pressure valve” for more xenophobic forms of nationalism. Aside from this specific mechanism, it is also possible that the drop in ultranationalism represented a “regression to the mean” following a period of heightened xenophobic movement activity in the public sphere brought on by national elections (this did not happen in the Netherlands, however, due to the exacerbating effect of the country’s economic recession).

In the single case of Spain, the effects of conservative party rule appeared to be reversed: conservative rule coincided with increases in liberal nationalism and ultranationalism, as well as declines in critical and populist nationalism. The shift from critical to liberal nationalism and from populist nationalism to ultranationalism seems to reflect a growing confidence in state institutions between 1995 and 2003. In 1995, Spaniards were largely disillusioned with the socialist government, which at that point had been in power for twenty-three years and was widely perceived as corrupt. In contrast, at the time of the data collection in June of 2003, José María Aznar’s conservative government enjoyed a moderate amount of popularity, despite a number of political scandals and its unpopular support for the Iraq war (Torcal and Rico 2004). A general satisfaction with state institutions was likely a product of considerable economic growth that followed the introduction of the Euro in 1999 and the government’s success in accumulating a budget surplus in 2003, as well as the anti-terrorism measures introduced in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which increased the sense of security in the country (Gil-Alana and Barros 2010). This scenario is consistent with the fact that the conservatives’ electoral loss in 2004, a year after the second wave of data was collected, came as a surprise to many observers

and was widely attributed to the government's mishandling of the Madrid bombings three days before the election (Bali 2007).

Interestingly, actual increases in levels of immigration, measured as the difference in the total immigrant share of the population in 1995 and 2003, were not associated with changes in nationalist attitudes in the QCA results, except when the change in immigration levels was accompanied by an increased salience of immigration issues in the public sphere (both factors were included in all the models). This is an important distinction, because in some countries the two phenomena were empirically decoupled, with immigration gaining salience in public discourse despite the lack of an actual increase in immigration levels or, conversely, with immigration increasing but not gaining prominence in the public sphere. Examples of the former pattern include Australia and the Netherlands, while examples of the latter include Spain, Japan, and the Philippines. The fact that it is the public focus on immigration rather than immigration itself that produces the observed attitude changes is particularly interesting, because it may suggest that the four types of nationalism respond primarily to other cultural frames that become publically prevalent at a particular time.

The results generated by QCA give us a general sense of the factors that produced the observed changes in the salience of the four varieties of nationalism between 1995 and 2003. Economic growth was associated with a growing prevalence of liberal nationalism and a declining salience of critical and populist nationalism, which suggests that when times are good, people view their nation-state in more positive and inclusive terms. The opposite was true as well: when economic growth stagnated and plunged countries into recessions, liberal nationalism and ultranationalist declined and critical nationalism increased. Controversies surrounding immigration accompanied by conservative party victories had similar effects to economic

decline, producing shifts from liberal nationalism to critical nationalism and decreases in ultranationalism. Terrorist attacks also resulted in a turn away from liberal nationalism and toward more restrictive conceptions of the nation's social boundaries. However, these exclusionary tendencies were combined with strong support for the nation-states' political and economic institutions, as evidenced by the increased prevalence of ultranationalism.

DISCUSSION

The empirical investigation undertaken in this paper has revealed four important characteristics of popular nationalism in modern democracies.

Popular nationalism is far more heterogeneous than is suggested by existing theories.

Comparative theories that posit the existence of two varieties of nationalism—civic and ethnic—and map them onto specific countries gloss over the complexity that characterizes popular understandings of the nation-state. The analyses in this paper demonstrate that nationalist attitudes are better represented by a more extensive typology. These contrasting results are understandable given that the ethnic-civic dichotomy focuses almost exclusively on issues of national identity, while I define nationalism more broadly, as a combination of attachment, identity, pride, and hubris. In practice, however, when people speak about ethnic or civic *nationalism* they often equate national identity with the overall ideology that defines the fundamental characteristics of a nation. In so doing, they ignore other, equally important dimensions of the phenomenon.

Furthermore, despite occasional slippages in its use, the ethnic-civic distinction was intended to describe the logic that governs a country's institutions, such as immigration and citizenship law, and not to serve as a theory of popular nationalism. Because it is reductive and static, this binary typology cannot account for the full variation in the shared representations of

the nation-state across countries and over time. In fact, these same qualities limit its utility for understanding national institutions. As Rogers Smith's (1997) magisterial study of American citizenship law demonstrates, institutional arrangements can oscillate over time between more and less inclusive policies, which reflect the ongoing conflict between divergent understandings of what constitutes the country's rightful social boundaries. Smith's findings point to the fact that legal arrangements cannot be divorced from the policy environments in which they are created, which in turn are shaped by shared (and competing) understandings of reality. If we want to understand the ongoing conflicts surrounding a particular policy domain in a given country, we must pay attention to the heterogeneous conceptions of the nation that inform them.

This brings me to the second contribution of this paper: *All varieties of nationalism are present in all countries, though their relative prevalence varies.* Nothing in the logic of the LCA models presupposed a particular distribution of classes across countries. Though it was entirely possible that some classes would only be found in some countries, the actual results did not follow this pattern: The four classes were found throughout the sample. These findings clearly show that multiple understandings of the nation coexist in each country and, as Rogers Smith's research suggests, are likely to compete with one another in defining public discourse and shaping policy outcomes. This heterogeneity complicates attempts to group countries into distinct nationalist camps. As the variance decomposition models show, on average, people are more similar to their counterparts in other countries than to their own compatriots.

The paper's third insight is that *the content of shared representations of the nation-state is remarkably stable over time.* Again, nothing in the model presupposed this finding. As was outlined in Table 7, both the content and the distribution of attitudes can in principle be stable or variable. Yet, the results were unambiguous: The means of the nationalism variables were

almost perfectly correlated across the two waves of data. This suggests that the set of available tools that people draw on to understand their nation-states does not fluctuate with economic, political, or cultural conditions, at least not in the short-term. Perhaps if we looked at a longer timeframe that included periods of significant turmoil, the results would be different. As Swidler's (1986) cultural toolkit theory suggests, people rarely revise accepted understandings of the world during settled times, but they do so readily in periods of widespread uncertainty.¹⁴

The fact that *the distribution of the shared representations across countries changes over time* is the fourth insight of this paper. Though the content of frames through which people understand reality may change only in unsettled times⁸, the probability that a person will select one existing frame over another is likely to be influenced not only by his or her individual attributes (or his or her habitus [Bourdieu 1990 (1980)]), but also by exogenous events. Changes in a country's demographic composition, economic conditions, security, or cultural characteristics are likely to alter the public mood (Rahn 2004), which can in turn alter the salience of particular understandings of the nation-state.

This seems to have been the case after 9/11 in the United States, a time when Americans came together in almost unanimous support of their government, and when the country experienced a dramatic shift from liberal nationalism to ultranationalism. These conditions made possible a series of policies, such as the Patriot Act and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, which would have been unthinkable at a different time. Whether the post-9/11 period was an example of a Swidlerian unsettled time, which had the capacity to alter the structure of taken-for-

¹⁴ Arguably, the period between 1995 and 2003 could be viewed as "unsettled" in many countries. However, the events that transpired did not seem to fundamentally alter the repertoire of shared representations of the nation in the twenty countries included in the sample. "Unsettlement," as used by Swidler, is a somewhat vague concept, so it is difficult to generate specific hypothesis about sources of major structural changes in available cultural repertoires. Perhaps more severe shocks, such as major armed conflicts that threaten the lives of large portions of a national population, would lead to drastically redefined understandings of the nation.

granted understandings of the nation-state, or merely a temporary crisis that results in the increased prevalence of some of the existing understandings is an empirical question. The results of this study suggest that the latter scenario is more likely.

Explaining the changes in the prevalence of the four varieties of popular nationalism is a difficult task, because the number of country cases is small and the array of possible causes large. Nonetheless, the QCA results suggest some preliminary conclusions. The distribution of attitudes seems to be influenced by certain combinations of economic growth and decline, welfare state expansion, changes in the public salience of immigration issues, conservative party politics, and national security shocks.

In addition to its substantive contributions to nationalism studies and political sociology, this paper has some general implications for the sociology of culture. First, the dynamics observed for nationalist attitudes may be generalized to other highly institutionalized domains, such as the economy, education, or family. To the extent that these domains are subject to international institutional pressures, we may expect to find cross-national similarities in the content of attitudes along with variation in their distribution across countries. Barring major shocks to the institutional order, those attitudes should be stable over time, but their prevalence should fluctuate in response to domain-relevant events.

Second, this study demonstrates the possibility of conducting large-sample comparative cultural research without falling prey to methodological nationalism. Simply because the nation-state is used as a sampling frame does not imply that it is the most appropriate unit of analysis. An inductive approach that identifies patterns among all the cases avoids the problems of cross-case incommensurability and arbitrary reduction of variation to the case level. The result is a set of cultural categories that may or may not map onto the cases in the sample. If the categories

and the cases are congruent, we can conclude that the cases are culturally distinct; if not, we can view this as evidence for at least partial overlap in cultural repertoires between the cases.

While this method was developed specifically for survey data, its principles could be incorporated quite easily into qualitative research designs. For instance, in an interview-based study of multiple settings, the researcher could code responses based on their overall similarity regardless of where they were observed and then, in a second step, identify their prevalence in each setting. This strategy would minimize the risk of artificially imposing the boundaries of the settings on the cultural processes observed, thereby maximizing the researcher's ability to observe and explain variation found both within and across settings. A similar process could be used to interpret data collected through ethnography or archival research.

CONCLUSION

The current study marks a first step in understanding the cross-national and temporal variation in shared representations of the nation-state. Its conclusions should be tested by in-depth case studies capable of comparing the survey results with other evidence of attitudinal change, such as voting patterns and media content. A case study approach could also shed more light on the sources of change in the prevalence of shared representations over time by identifying important variables omitted in the present analyses. Furthermore, it could help relate the findings to important political outcomes, such as support for political parties and social movements.

In addition to empirical extensions of the study, much more work needs to be done to theorize the role of popular nationalism in the context of contemporary politics. How do popular attitudes relate to the preferences and actions of elites? How is policy shaped by these preferences? What role do such attitudes play in the mobilization of publics by social movements? What is the relationship between popular nationalist attitudes and eruptions of

more incendiary forms of nationalism? What conditions are necessary to unsettle the content of shared representations of the nation? All of these questions merit serious theoretical consideration, which can subsequently inform empirical research.

This paper has sought to advance research on nationalism and culture by demonstrating that it is possible to avoid the pitfalls of reductive cross-national comparisons that do not take into consideration both within- and between-country variation in attitudes. The approach presented here explicitly treats the appropriateness of studying nationalism at the country level as an empirical question rather than a foregone conclusion. The results challenge existing models of nationalism that reduce the phenomenon to a binary distinction mapped onto individual countries. Instead, the study demonstrates that multiple varieties of popular nationalism can be found across a variety of national contexts and that the content of popular nationalism is remarkably stable over time, while its distribution within and across countries varies in response to economic, political, and cultural events.

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Appendix A. Measures of Nationalism, ISSP 1995, 2003

- I. National Attachment (4-point scale: Not close at all, Not very close, Close, Very Close)
1. CLSSTAT: “How close do you feel to [county/province/state]?”
 2. CLSCTRY: “How close do you feel to [country]?”
 3. CLSCONT: “How close do you feel to [continent]?”
- II. National Identity (4-point scale: Not important at all, Not very important, Fairly important, Very important)
- “Some people say the following things are important for being truly [nationality]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?”
1. IMPANC: “To have [nationality] ancestry.” (*ASKED ONLY IN 2003*)
 2. IMPBORN: “To have been born in [country].”
 3. IMPCIT: “To have [nationality] citizenship.”
 4. IMPFEEL: “To feel [nationality].”
 5. IMPLANG: “To be able to speak [language].”
 6. IMPLAW: “To respect [nationality] political institutions and laws.”
 7. IMPLIV: “To have lived in [country] for most of one’s life.”
 8. IMPREL: “To be a [religion].”
- III. National Pride (4-point scale: Not proud at all, Not very proud, Somewhat proud, Very proud)
- “How proud are you of [country] in each of the following?”
1. PRDART: “Its achievements in the arts and literature.”
 2. PRDDEM: “The way democracy works.”
 3. PRDECO: “[Country’s] economic achievements.”
 4. PRDGRP: “Its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society.”
 5. PRDHIS: “Its history.”
 6. PRDMIL: “[Country’s] armed forces.”
 7. PRDPOL: “Its political influence in the world.”
 8. PRDSCI: “Its scientific and technological achievements.”
 9. PRDSPT: “Its achievements in sports.”
 10. PRDSSS: “Its social security system.”
- IV. Hubris (5-point scale: Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neither agree or disagree, Agree, Strongly agree)
- “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?”
1. HUBCIT: “I would rather be a citizen of [country] than of any other country in the world.”
 2. HUBCTRY: “Generally speaking, [country] is a better country than most other countries.”
 3. HUBPEOP: “The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the [nationality].”
 4. HUBIFWR: “People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong.”
 5. HUBSHAM: “There are some things about [country] today that make me feel ashamed of [country].” [This item is reverse-coded in the analysis.]